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ABSTRACT 
 
The Integrated Safety Assessment (ISA) methodology, developed by the Spanish Nuclear 
Safety Council (CSN), has been applied to a thermo-hydraulical analysis of a Westinghouse 3-
loop PWR plant by means of the dynamic event trees (DET) for Steam Generator Tube 
Rupture (SGTR) sequences. The ISA methodology allows obtaining the SGTR Dynamic 
Event Tree taking into account the operator actuation times. Simulations are performed with 
SCAIS (Simulation Code system for Integrated Safety Assessment), which includes a dynamic 
coupling with MAAP thermal hydraulic code. The results show the capability of the ISA 
methodology and SCAIS platform to obtain the DET of complex sequences.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
As part of the collaboration between Universidad Politécnica de Madrid (UPM), Indizen 
Technologies and the Spanish Nuclear Safety Council (CSN), an analysis of Steam Generator 
Tube Rupture (SGTR) sequences in a PWR Westinghouse has been performed with SCAIS, 
see [1]. The objective of the analysis has been the application of the Integrated Safety 
Assessment (ISA) methodology in order to obtain the SGTR Dynamic Event Tree taking into 
account the operator actuation times. 
 
The ISA methodology has been developed by the Modeling and Simulation (MOSI) branch of 
CSN. ISA is an adequate method to perform the uncertainty analysis, especially suited to 
compute uncertainties for those sequences where some of the events occur at uncertain times 
(time delay of operator response and other stochastic events) along with usual parametric 
uncertainties. The numerical results of this methodology include among others of the Damage 
Exceedance Frequency (DEF) for the sequences stemmed from an initiating event. This is 
done along with the delineation of the dynamic event tree and the identification of the damage 
domain (DD) of the sequences that contribute to the total DEF. The damage domain is defined 
as the region of the space of uncertain parameters of interest that results in damage (see [2]). 
The 9th International Topical Meeting on Nuclear Thermal-Hydraulics, Operation and Safety (NUTHOS-9)                 N9P0174 
Kaohsiung, Taiwan, September 9-13, 2012 
2/12 
 
DEF is then computed by integrating the general mathematical framework of ISA equations 
for the damage frequency (TSD, Theory of Stimulated Dynamics, see [6]). The UPM group 
has applied extensively this methodology in several projects; for more details see [1] to [5]. 
ISA methodology introduces some differences with respect the classical Probabilistic Safety 
Analysis (PSA): 
 
• Header Demand: In PSA event trees, header intervention (i.e., demand of a safety 
function) is decided on the basis of generic analyses. On the contrary, demand for header 
intervention in ISA is a simulation result. As a result, the number of possible branches in 
a header is different in PSA and ISA. In PSA there are two branches for a header: failure 
or success, but ISA considers three possible branches for a header in every sequence: 
demanded with failure, demanded with success and not demanded. 
 
• Success Criteria: Event tree headers in PSA are usually defined at safety function level, 
i.e., each header represents the successful achievement of a safety function. System 
success criteria are therefore needed to develop the header fault trees. In the ISA context, 
however, event tree headers can represent hardware states (system trains working or not) 
or operator actions. Therefore, ISA fault trees are used to calculate the probability of each 
system configuration, not to quantify failure probabilities.  
 
• Human Actions: In PSA a human action is failed if it is not performed within a pre-
specified time interval (available time). An action delayed beyond the available time is 
treated as a non-performed action. In ISA methodology, human actions are events 
occurring at uncertain times. A delayed action is still a performed action even if it is not 
able to avoid a damage condition (limit exceedance). As a consequence, a PSA success 
sequence, when analysed in the ISA context, may contain a non-empty damage domain 
resulting from excessive delays of protective actions. 
 
• Available Times: In PSA the available time of a header has a value for each sequence. 
In ISA methodology it is a function of the uncertain times and parameters and also the 
status of the systems that have been demanded during the sequence. 
 
• End State: The end state of a sequence in PSA event trees is a discrete variable with 
two possible values: either success or failure. The end state of ISA sequences, however, 
is a random variable where each final state (damage or success) has an associated 
probability. Success and failure probabilities are obtained from the sequence uncertainty 
analysis. PSA end states can be seen as a particular case of ISA end states where the 
only possible probability values are 0 or 1. 
 
• Failure Probabilities: In PSA the systems failure probabilities do not depend on the 
dynamics of the sequence. In ISA methodology the failure rate could depend on process 
variables (i.e. temperature or humidity conditions in the proximity of a pump). The 
general mathematical framework of ISA equations for the damage frequency is the 
Theory of Stimulated Dynamics (TSD), see [6]. These equations are simplified if the 
failure rates do not depend on the process variables, as it is the case in this analysis. 
 
• Damage Condition: In PSA Level 1 the damage condition is the LOCA acceptance 
criterion, Max PCT > 2200 F (1477.15 K). In ISA methodology several damage criteria 
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can be handled within the same analysis, allowing obtaining the DEF for all the safety 
variables (safety barriers) of interest. 
 
Application of ISA methodology can be split into the following blocks (the general block-
diagram is shown in Fig. 1, see also [1]): 
 
• Block A, the sequence generation module performing the simulation of dynamic event 
trees. This will provide the candidate sequences with non-trivial DD (success or 
damage for all conditions) that will be analyzed in detail in the Path Analysis module 
(Block B). 
 
• Block B, the paths analysis module that is repeatedly simulated with different values of 
uncertain parameters and/or time delays (human actions or stochastic phenomena) of 
each sequence of interest obtained in block A. Each such simulation, called a path, can 
end either in a success or damage state. The region of parameter and/or time delays 
values that leads to damage paths is the DD of the sequence. 
 
• Block C, the probability and delay times quantification module that provides the 
necessary information to calculate in Block D (Risk Assessment) the probabilities and 
the contribution to DEF of each sequence of interest.  
 
• Block D, the risk assessment module that calculates the DEF by integrating on the DD 
region identified in block A, the probability distributions obtained in Block B (Path 
Analysis module). 
 
PATH ANALYSIS:
SEEKING
DAMAGE DOMAINS EXCEEDANCE FREQUENCY
RISK ASSESSMENT:
CALCULATION
SIMULATION CONTROL
GENERATION AND AND DELAY TIMES
QUANTIFICATION
CLASSICAL PROBABILITYSEQUENCE
BLOCK B
BLOCK A BLOCK C
BLOCK D
 
Fig. 1. ISA methodology general diagram. 
 
Apart from a theoretical approach that is at the basis of the method, application of ISA requires 
a set of computational tools. A suitable software package called SCAIS (Simulation Code 
system for ISA) implements the above referred method, see [1]. Current SCAIS development 
includes as main elements: 
 
• General Simulation Driver (BABIECA), that solves step by step topologies of block 
diagrams. 
• Event Scheduler (DENDROS), that drives the dynamic simulation of the different 
incidental sequences. Its design guarantees modularity of the overall system and the 
parallelization of the event tree generation. 
• Plant Models, allowing simulation of nuclear accident sequences. This includes codes 
for simulation of thermal hydraulics and severe accident phenomenology, as well as 
codes for simulation of operating procedures and severe accident management 
guidelines, for more details see [7]. Codes as MAAP, RELAP, TRACE can be adapted 
The 9th International Topical Meeting on Nuclear Thermal-Hydraulics, Operation and Safety (NUTHOS-9)                 N9P0174 
Kaohsiung, Taiwan, September 9-13, 2012 
4/12 
 
to perform tree simulations under control of the scheduler. At present MAAP4, see [8], 
is coupled to BABIECA to build up a distributed plant simulation1.  
• Probability Calculator, which incrementally performs the Boolean product of the fault 
trees corresponding to each system that intervene in the sequence, additionally 
computing its probability. 
• Path Analysis Module, which repeatedly simulates each sequence of interest with 
different values of uncertain parameters and/or time delays (human actions or stochastic 
phenomena). 
• Risk Assessment Module, which calculates the DEF by integrating TSD equations on 
the DD region. 
 
2. SEQUENCES GENERATION MODULE. DYNAMIC EVENT TREE 
SIMULATION 
 
The objective of Block A of the ISA methodology is to simulate the dynamic event tree (DET) 
stemming from an initiating event. At present, the simulations of DET performed by coupling 
MAAP and DENDROS are performed in an automatic way, see [7]. 
 
2.1. Application to SGTR Sequences. 
 
In this study a SGTR event at full power in a three-loop PWR Westinghouse design has been 
considered. Such accidents begin as a breach barrier between the primary Reactor Coolant 
System (RCS) and the secondary side of the steam generator (SG), and provide a direct release 
path for RCS fluid to the environment via the secondary side (steam-dump, safety and relief) 
valves. 
 
Main human actions within Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) needed in order to 
optimally recover the transient are depicted in Fig. 2. With these actions in mind, the principal 
stages of SGTR sequences are: 
 
• Reactor trip and Safety Injection (SI) signal. 
Due to SGTR the reactor coolant inventory decreases and leads to a manual/automatic 
reactor trip. The decrease in RCS pressure results in a low pressurizer pressure SI 
signal, Main Feed Water (MFW) system trip and actuation of the Auxiliary Feed Water 
(AFW) system to deliver flow to all steam generators. 
 
• Identification and Isolation of the ruptured SG. 
Once the ruptured SG has been identified, recovery actions begin by Isolating AFW 
flow to the ruptured SG and closing the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) on the 
steamline corresponding to the affected SG, aiming to minimize radiological releases, 
to reduce the possibility of overfilling the affected SG and to enable the operator to 
establish a pressure differential between the ruptured and intact SGs as a necessary step 
toward terminating primary to secondary leakage. 
 
• Cooldown of the RCS system by means of the intact SGs. 
After isolation of the ruptured SG, the RCS is cooled as fast as allowed, dumping steam 
from the intact SGs. In the case of unavailability of the normal steam dump system to 
the condenser; this cooldown is performed by dumping steam via the Power Operated 
Relief Valves (PORVs) on the intact SGs. The cooldown is finished when the 
cooldown target temperature is reached. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
  Currently, a coupling to TRACE similar to the case of MAAP is being developed by Indizen in 
collaboration with CSN, see [7]. 
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• Depressurization of RCS to restore inventory. 
During the cooldown process, SI flow will tend to keep RCS pressure and primary to 
secondary break flow will continue. Consequently, SI flow must be terminated to stop 
break flow; however, adequate inventory must be first assured. This includes both 
sufficient RCS subcooling and pressurizer inventory to maintain a reliable pressurizer 
level indicator after SI flow is stopped. The depressurization is performed using normal 
pressurizer spray or a pressurizer PORV. 
 
• Terminate SI. 
Once RCS subcooling, secondary side heat sink, and reactor coolant inventory have 
been adequately established, SI flow is no longer required. Thus, SI flow is stopped to 
terminate primary to secondary break flow and to prevent repressurization of the RCS. 
 
• Long term cooling. 
Finally, RHR system provides with long term cooling.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Summary of standard Westinghouse EOPs in the case of SGTR sequences. 
 
 
In a first step, several SGTR event trees (ET), corresponding to PSA studies of similar nuclear 
power plants (Westinghouse design with 3 loops) have been analyzed to build a generic SGTR 
event tree including EOPs, Fig. 3. Sequence headers and success criteria considered after this 
review are:  
SCRAM: Reactor trip; HPI: High Pressure Injection system (1/2 pumps); AFW: Auxiliary 
Feed Water system (1/3 pumps); ISO-SG: Isolate ruptured SG (close MSIV on ruptured SG); 
The 9th International Topical Meeting on Nuclear Thermal-Hydraulics, Operation and Safety (NUTHOS-9)                 N9P0174 
Kaohsiung, Taiwan, September 9-13, 2012 
6/12 
 
DSP-EP:  Cooldown and Depressurization of RCS (cooldown dumping steam from PORVs 
on intact SGs and depressurization with pressurizer PORV); DSP-LP:  Cooldown and 
depressurization of RCS (cooldown, 55 K/h rate, dumping steam from PORVs on intact SGs 
and depressurization with pressurizer sprays; FB: Feed and Bleed (1/2 HPI pumps, 1 PORV); 
C-PORV/RSIS: Terminate SI (control charging flow); REC-HP: High Pressure 
Recirculation (injection to 2/3 legs of RCS with 1/2 HPSI pumps and 1/2 LPSI pumps); 
RWST: Refill of Water Storage Tank; RHR: Residual Heat Removal. 
 
 
Fig. 3. SGTR. Generic Event Tree (GET) with EOPs. 
 
One of the main difficulties in SGTR simulations is the selection of the operator action timing, 
which is very plant-specific. Nevertheless the timing are in the same range comparing similar 
plants based on operator training on full-scope simulators, see Table 1 and see also [9] to [16]. 
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Taking into account this information, a set of representative values for the DET-SGTR analysis 
has been obtained, see Table 2. The total time required to complete the recovery operations lies 
of both operator action time and system plant response times. For instance, the time for each of 
the major recovery operations (i.e., RCS cooldown) is primarily due to the time required for the 
system response, whereas the operation action time is reflected by the time required for the 
operator to perform the intermediate action steps.  
  
Table 1. Spectrum of operator times in SGTR sequences. 
Plant 
WCAP-
10698 Watts Bar 
Beaver 
 Valley 
Harris 
NP 
Prairie 
 Island  
Turkey 
Point 
Reference 
1987 
LEWIS 
1992 
BOCHMAN 
2006 
FENOC 
2000 
WEC 
2011 
SCHIMMEL-3 
2011 
KILEY 
Operator Action Time (s) Time (s) Time (s) Time (s) Time (s) Time (s) 
Identify and 
Isolate Ruptured 
SG  600 900 900 720 
Calculated by 
TH code 1200 
Begin RCS 
Cooldown  (420-480) 429 144 300 
1140 from 
SCRAM 
1680 
from 
SCRAM 
End RCS Cooldown  Calculated by TH code 
Begin Depress. (360-480) 147 240 240 420 360 
End Depress.  Calculated by TH code 
Begin SI 
Termination 420 244.2 180 180 120 120 
SI Termination and 
Pressure Equal. Calculated by TH code 
 
Table 2. Summarized operator times included in DET simulation. 
Operator Action Description (EOP, step) Time (s) 
Ruptured SG Isolation  AFW flow to ruptured SG and 
 MSIV on ruptured SG. (E-3, step 3) 
900 
Start RCS Cooldown 
 
With PORVs on the intact SGs. 
(E-3, step 13) / (ECA-3.1, step 11) 
1140 / 2260 
End RCS Cooldown  Target RCS temperature Calculated by MAAP         
Start Depressurization 
 
With PZR- PORV. (E-3, step 16). 
With PZR-spray.    (ECA-3.1, step 15). 
1780/2260 
End Depressurization RCS  pressure equal to ruptured SG. Calculated by MAAP         
Terminate SI (E-3, step 17) / (ECA-3.1, step 19) 2200 / 2900 
Heaters control and 
Accums. isolation 
(ES-3.1, step 1)/(ECA-3.1, step 19) 2900 / 3000 
Start Cooldown With PORVs on intact SGs (ES-3.1, step 5) 3000 
Start RCS 
Depressurization 
 With PZR-spray. (ES-3.1, step 8) 3600 
RHR   RHR conditions. Calculated by MAAP   
 
All simulations performed in this analysis with DENDROS-MAAP include as hypothesis 
Success criteria for headers SCRAM, AFW and RC-HP; in addition RWST and RHR 
headers are not included in the analysis. Therefore, the headers considered in simulations are: 
HPI (named H in DET), ISO-SG (named I in the DET), DSP-EP (named SD in DET), DSP-
LP (named LD in DET), C-PORV/RSIS (named R in DET). Simulations are finished when 
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RHR conditions are reached (success sequence), PCT> 1477.15 K (damage sequence) or Time 
> 24 hours. In addition, twenty four operator actions, corresponding to EOPs E-3, ES-3.1, 
ECA-3.1 and ECA-3.2, have been included in DET simulation. 
 
The DET, Fig. 4, provides the actuation time for systems and branching time for headers. The 
main variables of the sequences of DET are shown in Fig. 5 to 6. For the purpose of DET 
unfolding, simulations do not consider time delays: each header occurs at the stimulus time or 
never. The identification of each sequence is carried out by the concatenation of header status: 
a header in upper case means success upon demand and lower case means failed upon 
demand. Main values of variables and times of events obtained from the sequences of DET 
are shown in Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.  SGTR. Dynamic Event Tree (DET). 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.  RCS pressure and level for every sequence of the DET. 
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Fig. 6. Integrated mass flow rate in tube rupture and steam releases from affected SG. 
 (Display simulation time 15.000s) 
 
Table 3. Sequence information obtained from the reference DET. 
Sequence 
RCS 
Press. 
Min. 
(Pa) 
RCS 
Level 
Min. 
 (m) 
Intg. 
Mass 
Flow 
break 
(kg) 
End 
Release 
Time 
 (s) 
Total 
Mass 
Steam 
Release 
(kg) 
Max. 
PCT (K) 
 
[Time (s)] 
ACCs 
Injec. 
Time 
(s) 
 
RHR 
Time 
 (s) 
End 
RWST 
 
Time 
(s) 
DM0: H-I-SD-R 2.1E6 20.8 4.1E4 2378 3.1E5 603 ----- 12053 ----- 
DM1: H-I-SD-r 2.1E6 20.8 4.3E4 2670 3.2E5 603 ----- ---- ----- 
DM2: H-I-sd-LD-R 2.5E6 20.8 5.0E4 2803 3.1E5 603 ----- 12067 ----- 
DM3: H-I-sd-LD-r 6.7E6 20.8 1.4E5 9134 3.3E5 603 ----- ---- 67509 
DM4: H-I-sd-ld 7.8E6 20.8 1.5E6 76811 4.0E5 603 ----- ---- 74264 
DM5: H-i-LD-R 9.1E5 20.8 9.1E4 9981 4.4E5 603 ----- 9981 ----- 
DM6: H-i-LD-r 2.5E6 20.8 1.4E6 54576 5.1E5 603 ----- ---- 53111 
DM7: H-i-ld 7.4E6 0.57 1.6E6 ----- 1.9E6 >1500 
[137000 s] 
----- ----- 73215 
DM8: h-I-SD 1.1E6 20.8 1.4E4 949 3.1E5 603 ----- 10380 ----- 
DM9: h-I-sd-LD 1.1E6 20.8 1.3E4 847 3.1E5 603 5151 11513 ----- 
DM10: h-I-sd-ld 7.8E6 20.8 1.3E4 847 3.1E5 603 ----- ---- ----- 
DM11: h-i-LD 9.1E5 20.8 5.2E4 ----- 4.5E5 603 ----- 10017 ----- 
DM12: h-i-ld 6.9E6 0.57 1.5E5 ----- 1.4E6 >1500 
[46823 s] 
47023 ---- ----- 
 
Results of DET show that damage end status is reached for sequences DM7 and DM12 (Fig. 
3) which corresponds to sequences S19 and S31 in GET, (Fig. 2). However in the GET there 
is another damage sequence (S12) which corresponds to one success sequence DM4, in DET.  
 
 
3. FUTURE WORKS: PATH ANALYSIS AND RISK ASSESSMENT. 
 
The Path Analysis Module (Block B) receives the sequence and parameter information of all 
branches of DET from the Sequence Generation Module (Block A) and determines the DD of 
the candidate sequences. At present, the simulations performed by coupling MAAP and 
PATH-ANALYSIS are performed in an automatic way.  
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Headers that may occur at uncertain times (mainly operator actions but also events with 
stochastic phenomenology) are defined as Non Deterministic Headers (NDH). In order to take 
into account this uncertainty a time sampling between the minimum time when the header 
event becomes possible and a maximum time (or the mission time, 24 hours) is performed for 
each NDH, see Figure 7. The approach for obtaining the DD of a sequence is shown in Fig. 8. 
If there are several non-deterministic headers and/or uncertain parameters, a multidimensional 
time/parameter sampling will be needed. Each sample gives rise to a path belonging to the 
sequence and the set of paths leading to a damage condition (i.e., exceedance limit) that 
depicts the DD of the sequence. 
 
 
Fig. 7.  Path analysis in a sequence with two NDH (headers A and B). 
 
 
Fig. 8. Examples of Damage Domain (DD). 
 
Once the DD is obtained, then it is possible to calculate the DEF by integrating the TSD 
equations inside the DD of each sequence ([6]). This integration module constitutes the Risk 
Assessment module (Block D, see Fig. 1). TSD equations evaluate the frequency density of 
each path within a sequence, and need several probabilistic data that can be obtained from 
several sources like pre-existing PSA’s and stochastic phenomena models (Block C, see Fig. 
1). TSD framework uses the concept of “stimulus” of a dynamic event header, defined as a 
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condition that enables the event. For instance, in the case of a protective action the stimulus is 
the demand of that action, directly derived from the simulation results. In addition, the 
probability distributions of NDH do not show mutual dependencies and do not depend on 
physical variables, i.e., probability distributions are known functions of the delay from the 
activation of the stimulus to the actual occurrence of the event.  
 
Path analysis and Risk Assessment (Blocks B and D of ISA methodology, see Fig. 2) have not 
been applied to this SGTR analysis, a research that will be performed in a next future. 
However, they have been included in other sequence analyses like Loss of Coolant Accident 
and Loss of Component Cooling Water System in PWR. Further details can be found in [2], 
[3], [4], [5].                        
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The results of DET simulation have shown that GET damage sequences are adequately 
reproduced by DET simulation; with the exception of one GET damage sequence which is 
found to be a success sequence in DET. This result shows the capability of DET analysis in 
order to perform PSA verification. 
 
In addition, it is known that in PSA each sequence has a well-defined final state, success or 
damage. This analysis has pointed out that depending on operator action times, it is possible to 
have a candidate sequence for the DD, sequence with damage probability and a success 
probability, illustrating the importance of Path Analysis and Risk Assessment.  
 
This paper shows an application of the ISA methodology for the analysis of SGTR sequences 
using MAAP-SCAIS codes. In general, the results have shown the capability and necessity of 
an ISA-like methodology in order to properly account for uncertainties in the time delay of 
operator response and other stochastic events along with usual parametric uncertainties in the 
evaluation of the safety in a NPP. 
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